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In March and April, President Alvaro Arzu's administration announced a number of measures to
lower the country's chronic fiscal deficit, sop up excess liquidity in the national banking system,
and cut inflation. In the short term, the measures are expected to reduce the gap between income
and expenses and ease inflationary pressures. But the government's tight monetary policies will
likely slow economic growth as interest rates tend upward, while increasing the tax burden on the
country's middle class. Moreover, in the medium to long term, the state may well face another fiscal
crisis, since the latest policies only represent stopgap measures rather than the structural reforms
considered necessary to attack the deficit at its roots.
According to Guatemala's Central Bank (Banco de Guatemala, BANGUAT), when President Arzu
took office in mid- January, his administration inherited a whopping global fiscal deficit that totals
6.292 billion quetzales, about US$1.023 billion at the current exchange of Q6.15 per US$1.00. The
global deficit includes both fiscal and quasi-fiscal shortfalls that, taken together, represent a total
of nearly 57% of the 1996 government budget of Q11.107 billion. Of the global deficit, the central
government only accounts for about Q1.599 billion, or 25% of the total. That portion of the deficit
includes a relatively small budget shortfall of Q339 million, plus about Q1.260 billion in outstanding
bills that the state owes to its commercial suppliers.
The lion's share of the global deficit, then, is actually short-term domestic debt and operating losses
incurred by BANGUAT during ex-president Ramiro de Leon's term in office (1993-1995). Under de
Leon, the Central Bank sold Q3.943 billion in short-term bonds to local investors that are scheduled
to come due this year. In addition, the bank has racked up a total of Q750 million in "operating
losses," which, among other things, include interest that BANGUAT has paid out to bond holders by
simply printing new money without backing. In general, BANGUAT's huge short-term debt reflects
policies begun by the bank in 1990.
Throughout the first half of the decade, consecutive governments have relied on state bonds to
encourage the repatriation of capital to shore up foreign reserves and maintain exchange rate
stability, while at the same time soaking up excess liquidity in the country to reduce inflationary
pressures. To attract buyers, the bank offers extremely lucrative interest rates that, at times, have
climbed above 33% for 90- day bonds. For the most part, the bank has continually rolled over most
of the debt as it comes due, while paying off only those debts that it could not renegotiate. As a
result, the total domestic debt held by BANGUAT has steadily climbed, with the bank's short-term
financial instruments currently valued at more than Q5 billion, of which nearly 80% is now about to
come due.
Since January, then, President Arzu's administration has been hard pressed to find measures that
would substantially lower the global fiscal deficit without continuing the cycle of debt accumulation
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begun under previous governments. Greatly increasing the pressure on Arzu, inflation began to
edge up again during the first two months of the year after dropping to a record-low annual rate of
8.6% in 1995. In January and February, accumulated inflation reached 2.18%, making it difficult for
the government to maintain its 8% to 10% inflation target for this year.
In addition, excess liquidity in circulation, combined with speculative financial pressures, led to an
accumulated 7% devaluation of local currency during the first two months of the year, forcing the
government to draw heavily on its foreign reserves to shore up the exchange rate. For example, just
in the first week of March when speculative pressures pushed the exchange rate up to Q6.25 per
US$1.00 BANGUAT sold US$39 million in reserves, representing about 6% of the country's US$639
million in total reserves at that time.
Consequently, since March, the government has announced several new fiscal and monetary
policies that aim to cut the deficit, reduce excess liquidity, and lower inflation. First, in mid-
March, the governing Partido de Avanzada Nacional (PAN) used its legislative majority to end
congressional debate over a reduction of the value-added tax (impuesto al valor agregado, IVA),
which was raised from 7% to 10% on Jan. 1.
During the electoral campaign in late 1995, PAN had promised to lower the rate back to 7% for
medicines and some basic-basket goods (see NotiSur, 02/22/96 and 02/29/96). In fact, in January
and February, PAN carried out lengthy negotiations with opposition parties on the possibility of
completely rescinding the IVA increase for all goods and services. Nevertheless, on March 12,
PAN which controls 43 of the legislature's 80 seats forced a vote on the issue, rejecting outright any
reduction in the IVA, even for basic goods.
Then, on March 15, BANGUAT announced new reserve requirements for the country's banks,
which, in effect, eliminate loopholes that, until now, had allowed financial institutions to evade
regulations regarding banking reserves. Under BANGUAT's previous rules, all financial institutions
were required to place 14.5% of their total liquid resources in reserve. In addition, the banks
were required to place another 19.5% of their liquid assets in Central Bank vaults in the form of
government bonds, for which they received interest payments from BANGUAT. Thus, the country
maintained extremely strict reserve requirements that, if adequately enforced, meant that banks had
to put aside nearly 34% of their liquid assets.
Nevertheless, most banks have taken advantage of a loophole in government regulations that
stipulates that most commercial bonds sold by the banks to investors are not counted as liquid
assets and thus not subject to the reserve requirements. As a result, banks have been transferring
much of their liquid assets into bonds, with the total value of such bonds growing to nearly Q4.5
billion by mid-March, meaning that many banks have a larger share of their assets invested in the
bonds than they do in monetary deposits. The process accelerated in the first two months of the
year. According to BANGUAT, a total of Q1.003 billion in commercial bonds were sold between Dec.
28 and March 7, raising the value of such bonds in the national banking system from Q3.492 billion
to Q4.495 billion.
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The terms of the bonds are extremely flexible, allowing both the banks and the holders to sell and
renegotiate them at any time. Thus, the documents are almost as liquid as monetary deposits,
basically undermining the country's reserve requirements and greatly increasing excess liquidity
in circulation. According to estimates by one influential local economist, this loophole drove the
real value of legal reserves down to about 11% of banking assets, rather than the 34% stipulated by
law. Under the new regulations decreed in March, the 14.5% reserve requirement for liquid assets
remains unchanged, but the government will now force the banks to deposit 22% of the value of
their commercial bonds in the Central Bank in the form of interest-bearing certificates of deposit.
At the same time, the 19.5% reserve requirement that the commercial banks were obligated to place
in BANGUAT vaults as investment in state bonds has been reduced to 10.8% to compensate for the
new 22% reserve law regarding commercial bonds. Thus, when all the reserve requirements are
taken together, BANGUAT expects that total legal reserves will climb almost to the original 34%
target, substantially reducing inflationary pressures.
Finally, in addition to the new reserve regulations and the decision to maintain the IVA at current
levels, in mid- April the Arzu administration submitted an "emergency" tax bill to Congress that,
if approved, could generate up to Q3.2 billion in revenue over the next two years, thereby greatly
reducing the government's global fiscal deficit. The bill calls for a temporary "extraordinary" tax
on income for all individuals and businesses that earned a minimum of Q36,000 (US$5,854) in 1995.
Taxpayers would be required to pay the levy twice, once this year and again in 1997. In 1996, the
government would charge a total of 1% on total income reported for 1995. In 1997, the tribute would
increase to 1.5% of income reported by taxpayers for 1996.
The bill also includes a provision that would allow taxpayers to avoid payment of the emergency
tax if they instead purchase ten-year government bonds. The bonds would be equal to 2% of annual
income reported by the buyer. They would earn annual interest equivalent to the average rates
for deposits registered each year in the commercial banks. Interest, however, would only begin to
accrue in the fourth year, giving the government a three-year grace period. All told, the government
expects that the emergency tax would reap about Q1 billion per year in extra revenue, while the
state bonds would pull in another Q1.2 billion. Of the total Q3.2 billion in expected income, 50%
would be used to close the central government's budget gap for this year, pay off some of the state's
debt to commercial creditors, and pay back holders of short-term bonds that BANGUAT is unable to
renegotiate.
The other 50% would be used by BANGUAT to compensate for its accumulated operating losses
and to cover potential losses in future financial transactions. The tax bill is likely to be approved
quickly by PAN's congressional majority given the fiscal crunch that now grips the government.
Indeed, to pave the way for the bill's passage, the government negotiated for nearly two months
with private-sector representatives grouped in the powerful business umbrella organization
Comite de Asociaciones Agricolas, Comerciales, Industriales, y Financieras (CACIF) to ensure their
backing before sending the proposal to the legislature. To win support from CACIF, the government
apparently made some heavy concessions. Among other things, when the Arzu administration
submitted the tax bill to Congress in mid- April, it simultaneously introduced another piece of
legislation that calls for rolling back state intervention in the currency markets to deregulate the
exchange rate, thereby allowing supply and demand to determine the value of local currency vis-a-
vis the US dollar.
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Although Guatemala has had a free-floating exchange rate since 1989, the Central Bank controls the
sale and purchase of 85% of the country's foreign reserves, with only 15% managed by commercial
banks. Under the proposed law, management of the currency markets would be handed over
entirely to the private sector. Moreover, the tax bill may contain some special provisions that favor
investors.
The details of the proposed legislation are still confidential since the bill is being reviewed by
congressional subcommittees before being sent to the full floor for a vote. But recent press leaks
revealed that one version of the bill contains a clause that would allow all those taxpayers who
choose to buy the government's emergency bonds to devote 20% of the value of their certificates
to the purchase of shares in state-owned companies. If true, such a provision would be politically
explosive since Guatemala's incipient privatization program has been completely stalled for more
than a year because of intense labor opposition around the country. Against this backdrop, business
leaders have expressed support for the emergency tax bill.
"Nobody likes to pay taxes," said CACIF president Humberto Pretti. "But in this case, it's necessary
to make some sacrifices to resolve the government's fiscal and monetary problems before they
explode beyond control. If we act now, we can avoid slipping into a situation of spiraling inflation,
chronic devaluation, and uncontrollable interest rates. We must provide the state with more
resources so that it is not forced to meet its obligations by contracting even more domestic and
foreign debt."
Still, business support is tempered somewhat by the Arzu administration's restrictive monetary
policies, which the private sector says will push interest rates much higher and stifle growth in the
short to medium term. Indeed, as a direct result of BANGUAT's new banking reserve regulations,
by the beginning of May average interest rates had grown to 27.33% for loans, compared with
about 22% during 1995. CACIF has warned that it may condition its continued support for the
emergency tax on a government agreement to lower reserve requirements, and most of the country's
commercial banks have initiated court actions to fight the government's new regulations. Perhaps
more important, however, the government's fiscal policies are bitterly opposed by labor and
grassroots organizations, as well as opposition parties in the legislature. The other parties, led by
the leftist Frente Democratico Nueva Guatemala (FDNG), fought hard to lower the IVA back to 7%,
since that levy which is basically paid by consumers as a sales tax particularly hurts the country's
low-income groups.
In addition, opposition organizations say that the emergency tax represents an unfair burden for
middle-income groups, particularly urban-based professionals employed in the public and private
sectors. Indeed, originally the government had considered imposing the tax on all individuals
who earn just Q24,000 (US$3,902) annually. Fierce opposition, however, forced the government to
increase the minimum to Q36,000 in the bill sent to Congress, but the FDNG and grassroots groups
are pressing for the base to be set at Q48,000 (US$7,804), if not higher. "The terms and conditions of
the proposed emergency tax reflect the authoritarian character of this government," said Manolo
Vela, secretary general the Asociacion de Estudiantes Universitarios (AEU), one of the country's
most active grassroots organizations. "The government only took the private sector's opinions into
account. It simply ignored workers."
LADB Article Id:  55696
ISSN:  1060-4189
©2011  The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute
All rights reserved. Page 5 of 5
The central criticism, however, is that the emergency tax only represents a stopgap measure to
temporarily resolve the government's short-term fiscal crisis, but it will not correct the structural
problems that led to the current financial crunch. Nearly all sectors including both the left and right
agree that a thorough tax reform is essential in Guatemala to correct the country's chronic fiscal
deficit. Last year, tax income reached 7.8% of GDP, an important increase from the 6.6% registered
in 1994 but still the lowest tax burden relative to economic output in the Western Hemisphere.
Moreover, those taxes that are collected represent a lopsided burden on lower-income groups,
since indirect taxes paid by the general population make up nearly 79% of the government's tax
income, meaning that only 21% of all taxes come from direct levies on income and wealth. Labor
and grassroots organizations argue that the tax system should be made much more equitable,
with income and property taxes raised substantially and indirect taxes that affect poorer groups
lowered. In contrast, the private sector and other conservative groups generally argue that the fiscal
deficit reflects excessive bureaucracy and state inefficiency, and they instead favor huge cuts in state
spending, particularly the privatization of government institutions.
Nevertheless, all sides agree that the government must launch a major campaign to crack down
on tax evasion, since an estimated 55% to 65% of all taxes simply go uncollected. "Once again, in
1996 just as in 1987, 1991, and 1994 the government is facing a financial crisis because the state's
income is not enough to pay for its expenses," said Veronica Spross, analyst for the conservative
economic think tank Centro de Investigaciones Economicas Nacionales (CIEN). "Why does this
situation keep repeating itself? The problem is above all one of tax collection...If the problems
of administration and collection were resolved, income would grow enough that it would not be
necessary to resort to an 'emergency tax' every three or four years...Evasion must be eradicated
through much greater controls and a firm penalty system that encourages people to pay their
taxes. Guatemalans must be made to see that payment of taxes is a citizen's obligation, and not an
intrusive or unfair request on the part of public officials." [Sources: International Market Insights,
US Embassy (Guatemala), 03/07/96; Reuter, 03/08/96, 03/09/96, 03/11/96; Agencia Centroamericana
de Noticias- Spanish news service EFE, 03/04/96, 03/12/96; Prensa Libre (Guatemala), 03/15/96,
03/16/96, 03/19-23/96, 03/25-30/96; Agence France-Presse, 03/10/96, 03/25/96, 03/26/95, 03/31/96; Siglo
Veintiuno (Guatemala), 03/17-19/96, 03/21/96, 03/22/96, 03/25/96, 03/26/96, 03/28-31/96; Inforpress
Centroamericana (Guatemala), 01/25/96, 02/22/96, 03/07/96, 03/14/96, 03/21/96, 04/11/96, 04/18/96]
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